in November 1382. The deposition of H _ asan in August 1351 and his replacement by one of his younger brothers, only seven months after his public coming of age, is equally illustrative of this tense process in which young Qal aw unids i.e. descendants of sultan al-Mans _ ur Qal aw un (r. 678-689/ 1279-1290) via his son al-N as _ ir Muh _ ammad, repeatedly lost the sultanate as individuals but without ever being ousted from the sultanate as a kin-group, or at least not until November 1382. In the Maml uk political environment, which was not at all geared towards the hereditary transfer of political rank and status, this situation seems somewhat paradoxical, especially when one considers that it was often the Qal aw unids themselves whose unruly behaviour had caused the very conflicts that led to their repeated replacements. 3 In part, it is this paradoxical situation of the Qal aw unid sultanate that will be explored in this article, from the thematic perspective of the age upon which Qal aw unids acceded to the throne in particular. 4 That is to say, was their age, or even their minority, indeed a political issue, as suggested by the case of H _ asan? And if so, does this shed any light on how the Qal aw unid paradox came to be maintained for so long?
Whenever the Qal aw unids have been deemed worthy of academic interest, their young age has been one of the things which has attracted scholarly attention. In the Encyclopaedia of Islam, Peter Holt remarked in a rather generalising way that, ''they were mostly young and inexperienced, some of them mere children, who lacked the essential power base of Maml uk households''. 5 Without doubt, a sultan's age and his ability to gather effective power in the regime were closely linked. The beneficiary nature of a sultan lacking such power for the ambitions of his political environment also stands beyond doubt. In fact, as this political environment, the military commanders (amirs) to begin with, continued to play a key role in the appointment of a new Mamluk sultan, one of the main explanations that is generally given for the remarkably frequent occurrence of heredity -and : Brill, 2006), pp. 123-168. 4 This topic is also touched upon in Van Steenbergen, [23] [24] [25] [26] [29] [30] [134] [135] [136] [172] [173] under age rule-in the institution of the Maml uk sultanate is exactly the ambition of those amirs. As Holt again put it:
The death of a [. . .] sultan is followed by the accession of his son, who during a brief reign serves as a stopgap (and formal linchpin of government) until the throne is again usurped by one of the magnates. 6 A variety of scholarship has tried to explain the Qal aw unid sultanate from this standard Maml uk accession pattern, focusing on issues of heredity and usurpation. Studies by two scholars in particular best epitomise this approach. Robert Irwin admits that in the fourteenth century ''no one questioned the rights of the descendants of Qala'un [sic] to the throne'', but he also notes that this happened ''without developing any explicit theory of hereditary succession, still less of primogeniture''. Amalia Levanoni takes the argument further, claiming that in being dynastic, Qal aw unid rule was nothing but a dysfunctional façade, a flaw in the Maml uk oligarchic conception of the sultanate, used as a tool to empower ''unsteady coalitions behind ephemeral sultans of Qala'unid [sic] descent''. Hence, by general agreement the Qal aw unids are considered a dynasty by accident and, indeed, nothing but a weak and prolonged stopgap. 7 In the late thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, however, the standard accession pattern was perhaps even more subtle than that depicted by Holt, and the Qal aw unid sultanate more dynamic and complicated than that suggested by Irwin and Levanoni. Accession to the Maml uk sultanate was in fact neither a consequence of heredity, nor of usurpation. First and foremost, it was the result of generating sufficient support among the political elite of the day, the high-ranking amirs in particular, whose oath of allegiance (bay 6 a) was a sine qua non among a new sultan's public accession observances, whether he were a so-called usurper or the heir of the former sultan. 8 As mentioned, those kingmakers-that political entourage of the new sultan to be-were most likely to favour a candidate who was the least likely to jeopardise the interests they had carefully managed to establish by the end of the 6 See, e.g., Holt, Age of the Crusades, 143 (though mainly referring to fifteenth-century succession practices). 
Maml
uk Under-age Rule and the Later Qal aw unids preceding sultans' rule. That is to say, it was deemed wiser to support a candidate who represented continuity rather than to advocate precipitatous change in the regime's fragile balance of individual interests. Hence, sons tended to be put on their fathers' throne, especially when those fathers had carefully managed to construct and maintain a balance of powers and interests that had enabled their prolonged rule as Maml uk sultans. In the fourteenth century, this conservative attitude among the political elite contributes significantly towards explaining the smooth transition from al-N as _ ir Muh _ ammad's long rule of more than thirty years to that of his son al-Mans _ ur Ab u Bakr (741-742/1341) in June 1341. But the general pattern of Maml uk succession policies did not end there, as shown by two occasions in the later thirteenth century and again with Ab u Bakr in August 1341, 9 when after a while the mature, succeeding son would demonstrate his unwillingness or incapacity to maintain his father's balance of interests, and would be summarily deposed. In fact, only then the political elite enthroned a real stopgap, a minor brother-the little al-Ashraf Kuçuk (742/1341 Kuçuk (742/ -1342 in August 1341-whose temporary accession was to pave the way for a new balance to appear and for a new strongman to emerge. In early 1342, however, this process did not come full circle, as the balance was shattered before the new man, the amir Qaws _ un (ca. 700-742/ca. 1300-1342), managed to consolidate it via his enthronement. 10 In the chaos that ensued, conservative attitudes regained the upper hand and the Qal aw unid sultanate was born. 11 Moreover, despite the fact that its commencement was indeed an accident, due to Qaws _ un's failure and the chaos he left behind, the Qal aw unids soon came to be much more than just that, and, their age was one of the issues that attest to that.
Certainly, not all of those Qal aw unids were minors like the infant Kuçuk when they acceded to the throne. If the aforementioned case of the fourteen-year-old H _ asan's coming of age in 1351 is taken as a guideline for the age as of which intellectual, or legal, majority (rushd) was considered appropriate, only a minority had not yet reached that status upon accession. Out of a total of thirteen enthronements of twelve Qal aw unids between June 1341 and November 1382 (H _ asan was put on the throne twice, in 1347 and again in 1355), only five times this clearly and deliberately involved the accession of minors. 12 Apart from two aforementioned minors -H _ asan, who was eleven at his enthronement in 1347, and the infant Kuçuk, presumably between five and eight in 1341 -they were al-Ashraf Sha6b an (764-778/1363-1377), who was ten in 1363, and his sons 6Ali (778-783/ 1377-1381) and H _ ajji, both only six or seven years old upon their accession to the throne, in 1377 and in 1381 respectively. And for most of these Qal aw unids, explicit source references clearly suggest that there was a public awareness of this minority and the limits it imposed upon their reigns. Ibn al-6Ir aqi (1360-1423) (752-755/ 1351-1353), both just fifteen or about to become fifteen when they were enthroned, in 1346 and in 1351 respectively, and Muh _ ammad (762-764/ 1361-1363), who was said to have been either fourteen or sixteen at the time of his accession in 1361. In fact, no explicit references to any minority issues were found in their case. For instance, all Ibn Kathir (ca. 1301-1373), had to say on Muh _ ammad was that, by 1362, he was ''a young man, less than twenty years old (sh abb d un al-'ishri n)''. With these three cases, and with the remaining five enthronements of Qal aw unids, age does not actually seem to have been a major issue at all. Though all undoubtedly still quite young (the oldest of them all, Ah _ mad (r. 742-743/1342), was about twenty-four during his short term of office; Ab u Bakr (r. 741-742/1341), al-K amil Sha6b an (r. 746-747/1345-1346) and H _ asan, in second instance, were all about nineteen, and Ism a 6 il (r. 743-746/1342-1345) was about seventeen), they were clearly not chosen because of any mouldable age, to act as minor stopgaps to an oligarchic system. As a result, however, upon enthronement, most of these eight mature sultans actually became deeply and actively involved in the power politics of their reigns, just as with H _ asan as he came of age in 1351. 16 The Qal aw unid paradox, as referred to above, was therefore taken even further. Not only did Qal aw unids continue to be put on a throne that was almost always 
uk Under-age Rule and the Later Qal aw unids taken by force from one of their unruly own, but also did the king-making elite not prevent such unruliness from immediately re-appearing when they decided, in the majority of cases, not to opt for a more docile youngster. And, considering the sheer number of Qal aw unid sultans, they were surely not short of options. On the one hand, up till the early 1360s, even the gradually diminishing number of sons of al-N as _ ir Muh _ ammad continued to offer possibilities for choice. On the other hand, the growing number of their descendants soon came to enlarge that pool of recruitment, especially after 1361. In 1361, for instance, Muh usayn's pronounced antagonism towards the amirs, an attitude that would, as mentioned above, continue to discredit his suitability as a candidate for the sultanate until his death in 764/ 1363. 21 In all, therefore, and in hindsight, a surprising phenomenon in the majority of Qal aw unid succession practices seems to have been the application of a criterion that came remarkably close to primogeniture.
As I demonstrated elsewhere, it was a combination of the failure to consolidate one's power, as with Qaws _ un in late Rajab 742/January 1342 and as with several other amirs after 755/1354, and of the prolonged fragmented nature of the regime's political elite, between 742/1342 and 755/1354 in particular, that accounted to a large degree for the Qal aw unid paradox identified at the beginning of this article. 22 Reasons for the even more peculiar age-related nature of this paradox with an elite that favoured the enthronement of older Qal aw unids and made the installation of minors under their guardianship rather an exception to that rule, remain a matter for speculation. Nevertheless, the latter issue does clearly suggest that nothing less than a dynastic reflex continued to favour these Qal aw unids whenever the sultanate demanded a new consensus from that fragmented or leaderless political climate. It was not just opportunism or lack of any better options that had resulted in a Qal aw unid sultanate. unids with a historic right to the Maml uk throne that was not easily denied, that at the time was best suited to create such a consensus, and that made them more, often much more, than just stopgaps. 23 Hence, entirely in line with these assumptions, the following incident was recorded as to have taken place in July 1377 between the strongman of those days, Aynabak al-Badri (d. 780/1378), and the 6 Abb asid caliph:
[Aynabak] requested from the caliph to appoint Ah _ mad b. Yalbugh a in the sultanate, because Ah _ mad's mother was under his control. But [the caliph] said: ''I will not depose a king, son of a king, and appoint the son of an amir!'' Thereupon, [Aynabak] said to him: 'But Ah _ mad is none but the son of sultan H _ asan, because his mother was pregnant with him from [H _ asan] when he was killed and Yalbugh a had taken her [to be his wife], without realising that. That is how Ah _ mad came to be born in his bed.' But the caliph said: ''this is not attested to ''. 24 Whenever the leaderless, fragmented political arena between 742/1341 and 784/ 1382 had to establish a consensus on a new candidate for the throne, a conservative, Qal aw unid dynastic reflex sprang into operation and the Qal aw unid paradox of enjoying the amirs' favour and dismay was furthered. Moreover, despite the fact that those Qal aw unids were surely to serve as a stopgap for others' interests, those others did not automatically have the complete freedom to use or interpret that reflex to their own benefit, whether by inventing genealogical claims or by enthroning minor mock sultans. The Qal aw unids' prolonged reign, dominating the political spectrum of Egypt and Syria for more than a century (678-784/1279-1382), was not a mere accident of a failing political system, but had become an established public factor of Maml uk political society in its own right. Within the non-hereditary institutional environment of the Maml uk sultanate, the Qal aw unid reflex was as close as it could come to constituting a dynastic principle.
